The Tunisian Republic is experiencing, in May–June 2026, a period of advanced systemic fragility, illustrated by two simultaneous developments:

• An unprecedented statement issued by the Ministry of Defence reaffirming the neutrality of the armed forces (21 May);
• Explosive revelations made abroad by former intelligence chief Kamel Guizani (1 June).

These developments are not isolated anomalies. Rather, they constitute visible symptoms of the erosion of the key pillars supporting the presidential system:

• The growing distancing of the military institution;
• Fragmentation within the security elite;
• A structural economic deadlock.

The regime is now operating in a survival mode under constraint—not facing imminent collapse, but lacking sufficient room for manoeuvre to absorb any major additional shock.

This dossier approaches the Tunisian situation and its regional implications through six complementary analytical perspectives.

Structure of the Dossier

I. Institutional Perspective — When the Silent Institution Speaks

II. Systemic Perspective — A Regime in Survival Mode

III. Actor Perspective — Guizani: Witness or Pawn?

IV. Informational Perspective — The Battle of Narratives

V. Regional Perspective — Tunisia in the Algiers–Rome–Rabat Equation

VI. Prospective Perspective — Five Scenarios for 2026–2028

Part I – Institutional Perspective

When the Silent Institution Speaks:

Anatomy of a Doctrinal Rupture

On 21 May 2026, the Tunisian Ministry of National Defence published a statement whose apparent brevity concealed considerable significance.

In Tunisia in 2026, a few lines from the Ministry of Defence are enough to shake an entire political imagination.

The armed forces were described as a republican institution founded on discipline, committed to neutrality and to the laws of the state, serving the nation rather than individuals or partisan struggles.

The statement explicitly denounced what it called:

“Repeated attempts to involve the military institution and its leadership in political tensions and bidding wars.”

The first noteworthy aspect is the formal issuer of the statement.

It originated from the Ministry of Defence rather than directly from the General Staff.

Although seemingly technical, this distinction carries substantial institutional significance.

It indicates that the statement reflects not only military leadership but also the civilian chain of command and therefore cannot be dismissed as a mere sentiment emerging from military barracks.

To understand the full significance of the statement, one must recall the historical tradition of Tunisia’s so-called “Great Silent One” — the armed forces.

Since independence, the Tunisian military has remained largely detached from civilian and political affairs, unlike many of its counterparts in the Maghreb and Sahel regions.

Under both Bourguiba and Ben Ali, the armed forces were deliberately marginalised in favour of security and police apparatuses.

After 2011, the military established itself as a guarantor of the revolutionary transition without ever claiming a political role.

Its public communications traditionally concerned military exercises, humanitarian operations, or demining missions—not political “tensions” or “bidding wars”.

Analytical Signal

The true event is not what the statement says, but the fact that it exists at all.

An institution that never previously felt the need to proclaim its neutrality has chosen to do so publicly.

This alone suggests that such neutrality is perceived as being under threat—or at least that its guardians believe it to be so.

The shadow of 25 July 2021 hangs over any interpretation of this statement.

On that day, the military found itself trapped within a political process when it executed President Kaïs Saïed’s orders to secure Parliament following its sudden suspension.

Many observers interpreted this as implicit endorsement of the regime’s transformation.

Today, the public reaffirmation of neutrality may be understood as an attempt at institutional repositioning.

The military is signalling that it is not, and will not become, an instrument of any further political drift.

Three principal interpretations currently coexist in Tunis:

First Interpretation: Institutional

The statement is viewed simply as a reaffirmation of established doctrine, without any specific political target.

Second Interpretation: Political Signalling

The statement is seen as a discreet message to the presidential palace in Carthage.

It conveys that the military’s loyalty does not equate to unconditional availability.

Third Interpretation: Preventive Deterrence

The statement is interpreted as a warning against any future attempt to enlist the military in political projects, particularly in anticipation of potentially explosive social tensions.

According to the IGH analysis, these three interpretations are not mutually exclusive.

On the contrary, the statement operates simultaneously on all three levels, which explains the strength of its political resonance.

Part II – Systemic Perspective

A Regime in Survival Mode Under Constraint:

Anatomy of Structural Fragility

To fully understand the two developments analysed in this dossier, they must be placed within the broader systemic context of the Saïed regime in 2026.

Since what the report describes as the constitutional coup of July 2021, President Kaïs Saïed has built a system of power resting upon three main pillars:

• Executive concentration of power;
• Judicial instrumentalisation;
• Neutralisation of organised opposition.

By 2026, all three pillars are showing signs of wear simultaneously.

On the political front, repression has reached a scale unseen since the Ben Ali era.

In November 2025, approximately forty individuals were sentenced to prison terms of up to sixty-six years for allegedly participating in a “plot against state security”.

In February 2026, the Court of Appeal upheld and, in some cases, increased those sentences, notably maintaining a thirty-five-year prison sentence against former intelligence chief Kamel Guizani.

According to the report, while this strategy may neutralise dissenting voices in the short term, it simultaneously generates growing passive resistance within state institutions themselves.

Economically, the situation is described as structurally deadlocked.

The rejection of a USD 2 billion IMF loan in 2023—presented at the time as an act of national sovereignty—deprived the regime of a crucial financial safety net.

Inflation, budget deficits and public debt have continued to deteriorate.

In January 2026, the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT), historically considered a moderate actor, called for a nationwide general strike.

This was the first mobilisation of such magnitude since July 2021.

The report stresses that this signal should not be underestimated.

Together with the military, the UGTT has constituted one of Tunisia’s two principal pillars of stability since 2011.

Status of the Regime’s Pillars

According to the IGH assessment, the regime is surviving under constraint rather than facing imminent collapse.

It still possesses the instruments of coercion—namely the police, national guard and judiciary.

However, their effectiveness increasingly depends upon fear rather than legitimacy.

The report considers this distinction fundamental:

A regime that governs through fear is inherently more vulnerable to external shocks than one that governs through consent.

Part III – Actor Perspective

Kamel Guizani:

Witness, Avenger or Pawn?

Decoding a High-Risk Testimony

On 1 June 2026, Kamel Guizani, former Director-General of National Security and Intelligence at Tunisia’s Ministry of the Interior, granted an interview to the platform Al Jazeera 360.

The broadcaster described the interview as a “historic testimony”.

The report argues that the interview should be analysed at three levels:

1. The profile of the individual involved;
2. The substance of the allegations;
3. The likely motivations behind his public intervention.

The Profile

Guizani is not a career political opponent.

Rather, he was a central figure within Tunisia’s security apparatus.

He occupied two of the most sensitive positions in the state:

• Director of Domestic Intelligence;
• Director-General of National Security.

His appointment as Ambassador to Bahrain in 2022, following his dismissal from the security services, is interpreted by the report as a classic example of a “golden exile”.

In other words, he was removed from the centre of power without being openly silenced.

His conviction and subsequent thirty-five-year prison sentence in 2025–2026 brought this period of mutual caution to an end.

Substance of the Allegations

Confidence Level: C

(Plausible but Unverified)

2020 – Request for Illegal Surveillance

According to Guizani, a presidential adviser requested that he conduct an illegal surveillance operation.

He claims to have personally informed President Kaïs Saïed during a late-night meeting.

According to his account, the President denied any knowledge of the matter.

Parallel Networks

Guizani alleges that two months after he refused the request, the operation was carried out through alternative security channels.

If accurate, this would suggest the existence of decision-making circuits operating outside official institutional structures.

Judicial Obstruction

Following the filing of a complaint and the opening of an investigation, Guizani claims that President Saïed personally telephoned him and requested that the matter be closed before reaching the courts.

Presidential Family and Security Involvement

Guizani further alleges that members of the President’s family and Khaled Al-Yahiaoui, head of the Presidential Security Service, gained unlawful access to national security files.

Epistemic Assessment

The report considers Guizani a first-rank witness.

His credibility stems from his direct operational experience within Tunisia’s security system.

At the same time, he is also a man sentenced to thirty-five years in prison and now living abroad, with little left to lose in relation to the current regime.

The report emphasises that both realities must be considered simultaneously.

His statements appear broadly consistent with what is publicly known about the functioning of the regime.

Nevertheless, no independent documentary evidence has yet emerged to corroborate his allegations.

The report therefore asks:

Is Guizani a witness, an avenger, or a pawn?

Its conclusion is nuanced.

He is likely all three at once:

• A witness to events he experienced firsthand;
• An avenger seeking redress against a system that condemned him;
• A pawn—perhaps willingly—within broader geopolitical struggles involving actors interested in amplifying his revelations.

This triple dimension does not invalidate his testimony.

Rather, it requires that each of his claims be assessed with caution and discernment.

Part IV – Informational Perspective

The Battle of Narratives Around a Fragile State:

Mapping the Flows of Influence

The dual sequence of events of 21 May and 1 June cannot be understood independently of the informational environment in which it unfolded.

The convergence of these two events within a period of only ten days—the military statement followed by Guizani’s explosive revelations—was not necessarily the result of deliberate coordination.

However, it generated a powerful resonance effect, whereby each event reinforced the narrative credibility of the other.

The report cites the example of an article published by the Italian newspaper Il Foglio on 22 May.

The newspaper headlined its article:

“In Tunisia, the military writes to Saïed: We serve the country, not you.”

According to the report, this phrase does not appear anywhere in the military statement.

Nevertheless, it encapsulates what the newspaper perceived as the political message underlying the communiqué.

In this sense, the newspaper effectively created a quotation that did not exist, while accurately reflecting what many observers considered the likely political intent behind the statement.

The Tunisian outlet Kapitalis, in an analysis published on 24 May, criticised this interpretive shift and observed:

“A solid institutional fact nearly drowned beneath a fabricated narrative.”

Assessment of Key Media Actors

La Presse de Tunisie

• State-owned newspaper.
• Generally aligned with the government.
• High factual reliability regarding official communications.

Business News Tunisia

• Independent private media outlet.
• Moderately critical stance.
• High factual reliability.

Kapitalis

• Liberal-oriented publication.
• Moderately critical of the authorities.
• High factual reliability.

Il Foglio (Italy)

• Opinion newspaper close to Italy’s conservative political circles.
• Supports liberal democratic principles.
• Factually accurate but politically interpretative.

Al Jazeera 360

• Qatari media platform.
• Documented opposition to President Saïed.
• Moderate factual reliability.

Maghreb Émergent

• Algerian publication.
• Analyses events through an Algerian strategic lens.
• Moderate reliability.

The report concludes that an objective narrative convergence has emerged among actors with distinct interests:

• Tunisian opposition groups;
• Qatar;
• Certain European diplomatic circles;
• Elements within Tunisia’s security establishment.

This convergence is not presented as evidence of a coordinated operation.

No proof supports such a conclusion.

Rather, it reflects a convergence of interests around a shared narrative:

the delegitimisation of the Saïed regime.

The practical outcome resembles that of a coordinated campaign, even if no formal coordination exists.

Part V – Regional Perspective

Tunisia in the Algiers–Rome–Rabat Equation:

A Theatre for Regional Rivalries

The report argues that Tunisia is not merely a country experiencing an internal crisis.

It has also become a strategic arena onto which regional and international powers project their competing interests.

Understanding Tunisia’s trajectory therefore requires an examination of these external vectors of influence.

Algeria

According to the report, Algeria is the actor most directly exposed to instability in Tunisia.

The two countries share approximately 1,000 kilometres of border.

Over recent years, Algeria has developed a discreet but significant relationship with the Saïed administration.

A major destabilisation of Tunisia would create several risks for Algeria:

• Increased insecurity along its eastern frontier;
• Uncontrolled migration flows;
• Potential infiltration by extremist groups operating in border regions.

Consequently, Algeria is portrayed as preferring a weakened but predictable Saïed regime over political uncertainty.

Should a major crisis occur, the report expects Algeria to respond through:

• Quiet but firm diplomacy;
• Conditional economic assistance;
• Increased vigilance towards Qatari and Turkish influence.

Italy

Italy is identified as the Western actor most exposed to developments in Tunisia.

The migration agreements negotiated between Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and President Saïed constitute a cornerstone of Italian migration policy.

A collapse of the Tunisian regime would likely:

• Increase arrivals on the island of Lampedusa;
• Undermine Italy’s migration strategy;
• Create domestic political difficulties for the Italian government.

The attention paid by Italian political and media circles to Tunisia’s military statement reflects these concerns.

Morocco

The report describes Morocco as an attentive but opportunistic observer.

Any weakening of the Algiers–Tunis axis could create opportunities for Rabat to expand its influence across North Africa.

Morocco is also monitoring developments through the lens of Western Mediterranean stability and the security of its commercial corridors.

Qatar

According to the report, Qatar—primarily through Al Jazeera—plays a role in amplifying dissident voices.

Doha is portrayed as viewing the Saïed administration unfavourably because of its nationalist-security orientation and its hostility towards political movements associated with political Islam.

At the same time, the report stresses that no evidence exists of direct coordination between Qatar and Kamel Guizani.

Regional Balance-of-Power Assessment

The report concludes that Algeria and Italy are the actors most vulnerable to a major destabilisation of Tunisia.

For this reason, both have a strong interest in maintaining what the report calls a form of negative stability—preserving the regime even if it remains dysfunctional.

Qatar and Turkey, by contrast, are viewed as being better positioned to benefit from a political transition through support for alternative political actors.

Morocco is described as pursuing a strategy of patient observation.

The European Union, meanwhile, is portrayed as divided.

On one side stand concerns related to migration management and regional security.

On the other stand demands for democratic standards and political conditionality.

As a result, the report argues that the EU lacks the cohesion necessary to impose significant political pressure without jeopardising migration cooperation agreements.

Part VI – Prospective Perspective

Five Scenarios for Tunisia (2026–2028)

The report identifies five plausible trajectories for Tunisia over a twelve- to eighteen-month horizon.

These scenarios are not mutually exclusive and may overlap or succeed one another.

Scenario A – Controlled Stability

Probability: 25%

Triggers

• Emergency financial assistance from the European Union or Gulf countries;
• Effective targeted repression;
• Temporary easing of tensions with the UGTT.

Consequences

• Preservation of the authoritarian status quo;
• Continued economic decline and impoverishment;
• Suspension of meaningful reforms.

The regime survives but does not become stronger.

Scenario B – Authoritarian Hardening

Probability: 30%

Triggers

• An attempt to launch significant street protests;
• A response involving mass arrests and extensive repression;
• The suspension of any remaining electoral or political opening.

Consequences

• Increased international isolation;
• A shift towards a permanent crisis-management economy;
• Further radicalisation among opposition groups.

According to the report, this is the most likely short-term scenario.

Scenario C – Major Social Crisis

Probability: 20%

Triggers

• Disruptions in food supply chains;
• Rapid inflationary deterioration;
• A call by the UGTT for an unlimited nationwide general strike.

Consequences

• Riots and widespread social unrest;
• Economic paralysis;
• Growing pressure on the armed forces to intervene, reviving memories of January 2011.

Scenario D – Security Fracture

Probability: 10%

Triggers

• Aggressive purges within security services;
• A failed coup attempt;
• The defection of a senior military officer or security official.

Consequences

• Institutional chaos;
• The military acting as an arbiter between competing forces;
• Increased foreign involvement in Tunisian affairs.

The report notes that the outcome of such a scenario would be highly unpredictable.

Scenario E – Negotiated Political Transition

Probability: 15%

Triggers

• International mediation, particularly by Algeria or the European Union;
• An agreement between the Presidency, moderate opposition forces and the UGTT on a political roadmap.

Consequences

• The emergence of a hybrid political system;
• Improved relations with international donors and financial institutions;
• Gradual institutional reconstruction.

The report considers this scenario the most desirable from a governance perspective, yet the least likely in the short term.

Analytical Closing Section

Priority Early-Warning Indicators

Critical-Level Indicators

• Unusual military movements around state institutions;
• The sudden dismissal or resignation of the Chief of Staff;
• A call by the UGTT for an open-ended general strike;
• Disruptions in the distribution of subsidised food products.

High-Level Indicators

• Leaks of classified documents to international media outlets;
• The sudden freezing of bank accounts belonging to officers or opposition figures;
• Delays in the payment of civil servants’ salaries;
• Discreet visits to Tunis by Qatari or Turkish envoys.

Strategic Conclusion

According to the report, Tunisia has reached a decisive inflection point.

The events of May–June 2026 are not isolated incidents.

Rather, they indicate that the pillars which made the July 2021 constitutional shift possible are entering a simultaneous phase of reconfiguration.

These pillars include:

• A military institution that had remained politically passive;
• Intelligence services that had largely remained loyal;
• A UGTT that had traditionally adopted an accommodating stance.

The report argues that the current fragility is both real and structural.

Nevertheless, it does not consider the regime to be facing imminent collapse.

The authorities still retain their principal instruments of coercion and continue to benefit from a minimal geopolitical safety net, particularly through Algerian support and Italian pragmatism.

However, their capacity to absorb additional shocks has been significantly reduced.

The report concludes:

“Tunisia in 2026 is a state that still governs, but no longer convinces—neither its institutions, nor its partners, nor an increasing share of its own public opinion.”

Sources and References

Level A – Confirmed Sources

• La Presse de Tunisie, 21 May 2026 – Statement by the Ministry of National Defence.
• Webdo.tn and RTCI, 21 May 2026 – Independent reproduction and confirmation of the statement.
• Reuters, Arab News, and France 24, February 2026 – Confirmation of appeal court rulings, including the 35-year sentence against Kamel Guizani.
• Coface Country Risk Report – Tunisia 2026 – Macroeconomic data and risk indicators.

Level B – Analytical Sources

• Business News Tunisia, 21–22 May 2026 – Analysis of the military statement and its implications.
• Kapitalis, 21–24 May 2026 – Critical interpretation of the communiqué and reactions to it.
• Maghreb Émergent, 29 May 2026 – Regional geopolitical analysis from an Algerian perspective.
• Wakat Séra and Africtelegraph, 29 May–1 June 2026 – Regional coverage of reactions to the military statement.

Level B (Interpretative)

• Il Foglio (Italy), 22 May 2026 – Article by Luca Gambardella presenting an interpretative reading of the communiqué.

Level C – Allegations Requiring Caution

• Al Jazeera 360, 1 June 2026 – Interview with Kamel Guizani, considered a direct but unverified source whose claims require independent corroboration.